Glossary and Guide to Theoretical Claims.
All entries and cross-entries are in italics. Relevant sections are cited in most
entries.
absent-mindedness. See absorbed state.
absorbed state. (7.7) Empirically, a state like fantasy, selective attention, absent-minded
day-dreaming and probably hypnosis, in which conscious experience is unusually
resistant to distraction. Theoretically, a case in which access to the Global Workspace
(GW) is controlled by a coherent context hierarchy , giving little opportunity for
outside information to compete for conscious access (4.32). See als ideomotor theory,
access, and options context.
access, attentional control of access to consciousness. Following common-sense usage,
a distinction is made between consciousness and attention, where attention is treated as
the set of mechanisms that control access to consciousness (8.00). See voluntary
attention, automatic control of attention.
Access-Control Function of the GW system. Repeated conscious access to an event can
increase the likelihood of accessing the event in the future (8.00). One of the 18 or so
distinguishable functions of the cognitive architecture developed here. See Prioritizing
Function (10.5).
accomodation. In Piagetian theory, a demand for adaptation that requires new mental
structures. In the present perspective, the pole of the adaptation dimension in which
new contexts are needed to deal with input (5.1).
acontextual (4.12). A coined term, along the lines of Markus and Sentis' (19xx)
"aschematic," to mean the absence of the appropriate dominant context needed to
interpret some potentially conscious input. Selective attention may operate by making
non-attended information acontextual, fixedness in perception and cognition may have
this effect, and perceptual learning may be viewed as the acquisition of a context for
interpreting the perceptual input, thus going from an acontextual to a contextual state.
action fiat. In William James' ideomotor theory, the momentary conscious decision to
carry out a previously prepared action, a notion that can easily be interpreted in GW
theory (7.1, 7.3).
action schema. One of the structural components of action, as shown, for example, by
action errors, which often cause actions to decompose along structural lines (1.44). See
goal context.
activation. A widely used theoretical mechanism in which numbers are assigned to
nodes in a semantic network. Each node typically stands for an element of knowledge,
such as a phoneme, a letter feature, or a concept. Activation numbers associated with
each node are typically allowed to spread to neighboring nodes, a process that can
model priming phenomena and associative learning. In GW theory, activation
numbers can be used to represent the likelihood that some event will become conscious.
However, activation cannot be the only necessary condition for consciousness because
of the Redundancy Effects, which show that repeated conscious contents fade rapidly
From consciousness even though they clearly continue to be highly active b
other
criteria (1.31, 2.33).
Activation Hypotheses. A set of proposals about conscious experience going back to F.
Herbart in the early 19th century, suggesting that ideas become conscious when they
cross some threshold of activation (1.31).
activation, spreading (2.33). See activation.
adaptation. In the narrow sense used in Chapter 5, the ability to match and predict
input. In a broader sense, adaptation also includes the ability to solve problems (6.0)
and act upon input (7.0). In the first sense it is treated as a gain in information, that is, a
reduction of uncertainty about the input within a stable context. The Redundancy
Effects show that all neural structures adapt selectively to stimulation. This may be
called local adaptation. The fact that repeated predictable conscious events fade from
consciousness suggests a kind of global adaptation as well (5.0).
adaptive system. Any system that works to match informative input. Information
processing can be viewed in terms of representations and their transformations, or
alternatively in terms of adaptive systems. As theoretical primitives, representation
and adaptation are quite similar.
Adaptation Function of consciousness. It is argued that the premier function of
consciousness is to facilitate adaptation to novel and informative input (10.2).
Adaptation Level Theory. A theory developed by Helson and others, still the major
effort to date to deal with the way experience is shaped by previous experiences along
the same dimension. In GW theory this is thought to work by means of conscious
experiences that modify related contexts (4.0, 5.0)
ambiguity. The existence of at least two different interpretations of the same event.
Ambiguity is one of the basic environmental conditions the nervous system must cope
with. It is rife in language, vision, conceptual thinking, the social world, in the
interpretation of bodily feelings, and in understanding any novel event. The prevalence
of ambiguity necessitates a neural mechanism that can combine many knowledge
sources to arrive at a single interpretation of the input. Global Workspace theory
describes such a mechanism (2.3, 4.13).
Analogy-Forming Function of consciousness. Human beings have a powerful capacity
for creating analogies and metaphors, focusing on similarities between otherwise
different experiences or concepts. This requires mental representations of these
different events to interact. The global workspace may provide the mechanism for this
interaction. Certainly novel analogies and metaphors seem to require consciousness to
be understood (10.00).
"any" arguments (2.5). A set of arguments for the existence of a truly global workspace,
based on phenomena in which "any" event of one kind can be demonstrated to interact
with "any" event of another kind. These phenomena include cross-modality matching,
biofeedback training, conditioning (within biological limits), the context-sensitivity of
conscious experiences, etc.
assimilation-accomodation dimension of adaptation (5.1). As Piaget points out,
adaptive processes may or may not be structurally prepared for some event. If they are
highly prepared, they require little adaptation to detect or learn the event, the case of
assimilation. If they are unprepared for the input, deep accomodative changes may be
demanded in existing structures. GW theory suggests that accomodative changes
require a change in the relatively stable contexts of conscious experience.
attention. In GW theory, the control of access to consciousness by reference to long-
term or recent goals (8.00). Attention may be voluntary or automatic. See Prioritizing
Function.
attentional access to information processing resources. Some psychologists have
suggested that the role of attention is to control access to knowledge and skills (e.g.
Navon & Gopher, 19xx). This is one motivation for the theory developed in this book.
(1.32).
attentional context. A goal context designed to bring material to consciousness, for
example by recruiting receptor orientation (e.g. eye movements), etc. See context,
options context, automatic control of attention, voluntary attention. (8.21)
attributional ambiguity. Given the fact that the thoughts, emotions, and intentions of
other people are invisible, and that we sometimes do not know our own intentions
either, there is much room for attributional error and variability. A particularly
interesting case is the issue of self-other ambiguity, in which the identical event may be
self-attributed or other-attributed under different circumstances (9.0).
automaticity, automatization. The tendency of practiced, predictable skills, concepts,
mental images, and perceptual stimuli to fade from consciousness. Automatic
processes tend to be dissociated from each other, they take up little central limited
capacity and resist voluntary control (1.44, 2.1, 5.13, 5.3). See also de-automatization,
habituation, Redundancy Effects .
automatic control of attention. Automatic mechanisms can control access to
consciousness (8.1). With practice, voluntary attentional strategies tend to become
automatic and involuntary. See attention, voluntary attention, and Prioritizing
Function.
Autoprogramming Function of consciousness. GW theory suggests that consciousness
is needed to develop new operating capacities in the nervous system (10.9). See Self-
maintenance Function.
behaviorism. Influential physicalistic philosophy of psychology, some forms of which
commonly deny the existence or functionality of consciousness.
bi-stable perceptual events. Many stimuli can be interpreted in more than one way.
Some involve reversible bi-stable stimuli, like the Necker Cube or figure-ground
illusions. Much more common are non-reversible cases. Perceptual learning typically
shows non-reversible bi-stability. The "Dalmatian" demonstration in 5.11 provides one
example. See ambiguity.
biofeedback training. There is evidence that any neural system can come under
voluntary control, at least temporarily, by giving a conscious feedback signal whenever
the target system is active. This remarkable capacity provides one argument for truly
global broadcasting of conscious information (2.5). See "any" argument.
"blind sight" Damage to the primary visual cortex sometimes leads to a condition in
which the victim can recognize visual objects without a sense of their being conscious.
This is an interesting and important phenomenon, but we argue that such difficult cases
are not to be used for constructing an adequate theory in the first instance (1.12). They
are, however, a challenge for a theory built upon more common phenomena.
brain duality The two cerebral hemispheres are well-known to have a major division
down the midline, connected only by the corpus callosum. In fact, there are midline
divisions even in the midbrain and possibly the brain stem. This is a puzzling feature
From the viewpoint of GW theory, which emphasizes unity rather than dualit
. One
possibility is that brain duality has a primarily developmental role. (3.3)
broadcasting, See global distribution
central limited capacity. Consciousness is associated with a central "bottle-neck" in
information processing, as shown by selective attention, dual-task techniques, and the
limitations of immediate memory. (1.34) By contrast, unconscious specialized
processors, together, have much greater processing capacity. See automaticity.
Chevreul pendulum. A classic demonstration of ideomotor control. (7.41)
coalition formation. See cooperative processing.
cognitive architectures. Cognitive theories that focus on the entire human information
processing system, rather than on particular subsystems such as short-term memory,
language, or vision (1.36).
coma. Damage to parts of the brain delimited by the "extended reticular-thalamic
activating system" (ERTAS) seems to lead to coma. This can be interpreted as damage
to the neural equivalent of a global workspace system. (3.12)
common sense. (1.31) Originally, the general sense modality that is presumed to
provide common ground between the special senses like vision and hearing. This
traditional idea has much in common with a global workspace. The common sense
explained the interaction between the special senses, and their ability to share certain
features like location, causality, and time of a single event. Aristotle proposed a set of
modern-sounding cognitive arguments for the common sense, but this concept is also
known in Eastern philosophy.
competition for access to consciousness. There are two kinds of competition, either
between potentially conscious inputs (e.g. in a dual-task paradigm), or between
different controlling contexts, when the input is the same (e.g. switching between two
interpretations in binocular rivalry or in linguistic ambiguity). Most cases of
competition seem to involve both (2.3, 4.35, 6.51, 7.8).
computational inefficiency of conscious processes. (2.11) Conscious processes are
generally much less efficient than comparable unconscious ones. Consciously
controlled skills are slower, involve more mutual interference, and are more prone to
error than the same skills after automatization
conceptual vs. perceptual conscious contents. See qualitative vs. non-qualitative
events.
conceptual context Unconscious constraints on conscious access to abstract concepts.
Specifically, the conceptual presuppositions that are needed to use conscious concepts,
but which are themselves difficult to access.
conceptual Redundancy Effects Repetitive concepts become more difficult to access
consciously. (See semantic satiation , Redundancy Effects ).
conflict-free sphere of conscious access and control. (7.83) A term borrowed from ego
psychology to denote the domain in which deep goal contexts are not in conflict, so
that a variety of conscious contents can be accessed with minimal mental effort.
conscious access vs. conscious experience. We speak of conscious experience of
qualitative conscious events, as in perception, mental imagery, inner speech, or
feelings. All these events have experienced dimensions like color, taste, texture, discrete
boundaries in space and time, etc. We speak of conscious access in cases like accurately
reported, currently "conscious" concepts, beliefs, intentions, and the like, where there
are generally no reported conscious qualities (1.54, 4.00, 6.52, 7.63). See perceptual bias
of conscious experience.
conscious moment (2.42) See minimum integration time.
consciousness. Operationally defined as the set of events that can be reported with
accuracy, and that are claimed to be conscious, under optimal conditions of report
(1.21). It includes qualitative contents, such as percepts, mental images, inner speech,
and feelings of pleasure, pain, and affect; as well as non-qualitative contents, such as
currently accessible concepts, beliefs, intentions, and expectations (1.25). The
operational definition provides a workable starting point about which other properties
can accrue, such as the fact that conscious contents load central limited capacity.
Theoretically, a conscious event is defined as a mental representation that is broadcast
globally, that is internally consistent, informative, and tends to be expressed in a
perceptual code (11.4). See necessary conditions for conscious experience and access,
conscious access vs. experience.
conscious experience . See qualitative conscious contents, conscious access.
consistency. See internal consistency.
context. One of the three main constructs of GW theory, operationally defined as a
system (or set of systems) that constrains conscious contents without itself being
conscious (1.53, 4.2). Context effects are well-known in virtually all psychological
domains, including perception, imagery, action control, learning, and conceptual
knowledge. Theoretically, contexts
are groups of specialized processors , some of them quite long-lasting, that serve to
evoke and shape global messages without themselves broadcasting any message (4.32,
5.11). Contexts can compete or cooperate to jointly constrain conscious contents. See
attentional context, options context.
context hierarchy. (4.32) A nested set of contexts that cooperatively constrain
conscious contents. Conscious events are always constrained by the multiple layers of a
context hierarchy. Because contexts can be thought of as recursively defined entities, a
set of contexts is also a context. (4.3) See Dominant Context Hierarchy.
context of communication. For communication to work, the speaker and listener must
share knowledge that is not conscious at the moment of communication. (4.24)
context-sensitivity. (2.1) A major property of conscious experience, which is always
shaped and evoked by systems that are not conscious. See context
Context-setting function of consciousness. One major role of conscious experience to is
create the context needed to interpret later experiences.
(10. 1)
contextualization. The process by which a conscious content becomes unconscious (due
to practice and adaptation), and thereby becomes part of a new context --- it serves to
constrain future conscious contents. See context, objectification, decontextualization.
(5.34)
contrastive analysis. The empirical evidence for GW theory is summarized in several
sets of paired contrasts between similar conscious and unconscious events (See Index to
Tables and Figures). For example, novel tasks tend to be much more conscious in the
beginning than they are after practice, even though their physical and psychological
role may be quite similar. These contrasts are analogous to experiments in which
consciousness is the independent variable, and all other factors are held as constant as
possible (1.22 - 1.24, 2.1).
Control Function of consciousness. In GW theory, conscious goal images serve to
control action. (10.4) See ideomotor theory.
cortical arousal. Électrical activity in the cerebral cortex that is typically fast, low-
amplitude, and desynchronized, and is associated with waking consciousness and
mental activity. Stimulation of the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System
(ERTAS) leads to widespread cortical activation (3.1).
cooperative processing (coalition formation). Specialized processors can work
together in pursuit of some consciously broadcast goal. Cooperating systems can, over
time, come to constitute new specialized processors. (2.32) When contextual systems
cooperate in this fashion they can be represented as a context hierarchy. (4.32)
de-automatization. The tendency of automatic skills after disruption to break apart into
more consciously accessible components, as in reading material that is printed upside-
down (1.44).
Debugging Function of consciousness. People tend to become conscious of violated
expectations. Conscious error detection may be necessary for such errors to be mended
("debugged"), though the details of repair are of course unconscious. (10.3).
Decision-Making Function of consciousness. GW theory suggests that voluntary
decisions may involve a "voting procedure" in which competing sets of specialized
processors add activation to alternative global messages. Those receiving the most
votes tend to remain conscious longest and have the "last word." The ideomotor theory
suggests that the last in a series of conscious experiences will tend to recruit effective
action, so that having the last word in the mental dialogue is extremely important (7.61,
10.6).
decontextualization. (4.14) See objectification.
default execution of goal images. The ideomotor theory states that conscious goal
images tend to be executed "impulsively" or by default, unless competing goal images
or intentions prevent execution (7.3).
Definitional Function of consciousness. In GW theory, conscious contents are shaped
and evoked by unconscious contexts, interacting through the global workspace. Thus
multiple knowledge sources interact to define the conscious contents, by bringing the
proper context to bear, and by resolving ambiguities of interpretation (2.32; 4.2; 10.1).
See Context-setting Function.
depersonalization. A type of self-alien experience, in which the victim feels estranged
From him- or herself. This condition is apparently very common in late
dolescence
and early adulthood, and places constraints on the notion of self. (9.1)
derealization. A condition in which the world is perceived accurately, but is felt to be
unreal. (9.1) See depersonalization.
Diffuse Thalamic Projection System. (See Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating
System. ) (3.12)
disambiguation In the GW framework, a major function of consciousness is to allow
multiple knowledge sources to interact in order to remove ambiguity in focal contents.
See Definitional Function of consciousness. (2.32, 4.13).
disavowed goals or emotion. (7.82) In many cases people can be shown to disavow
goals or emotions which, by other empirical criteria, they clearly have. This suggests a
conflict between voluntary and involuntary expression of goals and a breakdown of
metacognitive access. The ideomotor theory suggests one account of these conflict
phenomena (7.8).
dissociation. Normally unitary functions are sometimes decomposed; conscious access
to these functions may be lost, at least for some time. Decomposability is one source
of evidence for specialized processors. Dissociation is observable in memory access,
knowledge representation, motor control, perception, and self states. (1.4, 9.1).
distributed system. A decentralized information processing system, in which many
specialized processors work cooperatively to solve shared problems. GW theory
describes one such system. (1.36, 2.2)
Dominant Context Hierarchy. A coherent set of contexts that controls current access to
the global workspace. Both conceptual and goal contexts seems to be hierarchically
organized. (4.32, 6.42)
Dominant Goal Hierarchy. One kind of Dominant Context Hierarchy, consisting of
nested goal contexts that together constrain access to the global workspace. It is
particularly important in problem-solving, voluntary control, and the self-system
(4.32, 6.42, 9.22).
dual-task measures of central limited capacity. Two simultaneous tasks will interfere
with each other if they involve consciousness or mental effort, even though they may
be very different from each other. This is one source of evidence for central limited
capacity. (1.34)
editing. The Dominant Goal Context shapes normal, voluntary action (7.00).
Conscious components of the goal structure are broadcast globally, so that unconscious
specialized processors can compete against (edit) those goal images which they find
flawed. Since the most informative components typically become conscious (i.e.,
those that are novel, significant, or conflictful), it follows that these components of
voluntary action must have been tacitly edited prior to execution if there was enough
time to do so (7.32).
Editing Function of consciousness. (10.3) Conscious events are broadcast to multiple
unconscious systems, which can compete against it if it violates their criteria. See
Flagging Function, Debugging Function.
editing time. In the GW version of the ideomotor theory of voluntary control, the time
between the onset of a goal image and its interruption by unconscious receiving
processors able to spot errors. See horse-race model, execution time.
effort, mental. See mental effort.
ego-dystonic. See self-alien.
ego-syntonic. See self-attributed.
emotional conflict. See goal conflict.
empirical constraints on any theory of conscious experience. See contrastive analysis.
Enduring Dispositions. A term used by Kahneman (1973), corresponding to long term
contexts in GW theory. (e.g. 9.2)
ERTAS. See Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System.
event identity, the problem of. If conscious events create new contexts, and contexts
shape later conscious experiences of the same event, it follows that the event should be
experienced differently at a later time. Thus the experienced identity of the event
changes with learning. This seems paradoxical, but it may be a characteristic feature of
the growth of knowledge, as Kuhn notes in the case of science (5.7).
execution time. The time from the onset of a goal image to the execution of an action
recruited by the image. If execution time is shorter than editing time, a slip of speech or
action is likely to occur. (7.32, 7.5) See also horse-race model, ideomotor theory.
Executive Function of consciousness. In GW theory, consciousness is associated with a
global workspace in a distributed system consisting of many specialized processors.
This architecture does not involve executive systems in the first instance, just as a
television broadcasting station does not necessarily involve a government. However,
the global workspace may be utilized by executive goal hierarchies to control a great
variety of activities in the nervous system. See biofeedback training, voluntary control.
(2.72, Chapters 6-10)
executive ignorance in voluntary control. In the ideomotor theory, the claim that
executive systems do not track the details of control. Everyone can wriggle their fingers,
but very few people know that the muscles needed to do this are not located in the
hand, but in the forearm. (7.3).
Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS). A convenient label for the
set of nuclei and pathways extending from the brain-stem Reticular Formation to the
outer layer of the thalamus and the Diffuse Thalamic Projection System, leading to the
cortex. ERTAS is closely associated with sleep, waking, coma, and cortical arousal ---
all aspects of conscious processes. This system has many of the features of a global
workspace (3.12).
fading of conscious experience with redundancy. See Redundancy Effects.
failure - driven retrieval of contextual knowledge. Presupposed knowledge that rarely
becomes conscious can become conceptually available when it runs into a severe
contradiction. (4.14). See de-automatization, decontextualization.
feature-integration view of attention. A recent theory suggesting that consciousness can
act as a "glue" to integrate separable features in perception. (1.32).
feedback. Two kinds of feedback may exist in a global workspace system. First, a
global message may be fed back directly to its input processors. Second, receiving
processors may feed back their interest in some global message, in order to support
continued broadcasting of the message. Probably both kinds of feedback exist. (3.2)
filter theory of attention. The hypothesis, associated in modern psychology with
Broadbent (1958), that the role of attention is to select some aspects of the stimulus
world for processing and exclude others. The role of attention is therefore to conserve
processing capacity for the most important things.
Filter Paradox. There is good evidence from selective attention experiments that
unattended (unconscious) stimuli are analyzed under some conditions to quite a high
level. This suggests that unattended input involves as much processing as attended
input, and thus vitiates the claim that attention saves processing capacity. GW theory
resolves the problem by suggesting that all input is highly analyzed, but only conscious
input is widely distributed to a multitude of specialized unconscious processors (2.2,
1.4).
fixedness. In perception, problem-solving, and action, being blind to what is "obvious"
to an outsider. Explained in GW theory as an effect of context (4.1).
Flagging Function of consciousness. Conscious (global) display of information can
mobilize many specialized processors to work on a common topic. This may happen in
biofeedback training, for example. (10.3) See Editing Function, Debugging Function.
fleeting conscious events Rapid, potentially conscious, limited-capacity-loading events,
which may be quite important in controlling voluntary action, for one example, but
which may be difficult to report under ordinary circumstances. However, they are
often reported in Tip-of-the-Tongue states (1.55). While such fleeting events pose
evidentiary difficulties, their presence is strongly suggested by GW theory (1.55, 6.52,
7.64).
focal consciousness. (usually contrasted with peripheral consciousness ). The part of
conscious experience that allows for the clearest discrimination.
fugue, psychogenic. Literally, a "flight" from reality in which the victim travels away
From home, adopts a new identity, and may suddenly re-discover his or her
ld
identity. A syndrome relevant to the issue of self
in relation to conscious experience (9.1). (See depersonalization, self-alien experiences ).
functions of conscious experience. Like other major biological phenomena,
consciousness plays more than one significant adaptive role. Some 18 separable
functions can be specified (10.00).
functional equivalents of a GW system (2.61). GW theory claims that consciousness is
associated with something like a global workspace, but that many system architectures
can behave in a functionally equivalent way. One can think of the system as a
"searchlight" rather than a "blackboard," for example, or even as a series of Mental
Senses, only one of which can operate at one time. All these systems seem to operate in
much the same way.
functional unity of specialized processors. In the act of riding a bicycle, steering,
peddling, balance, and visual perception are closely coordinated in a single processing
coalition. This coalition may be decomposed and reorganized when one steps off the
bicycle and begins to walk. In the same sense, perhaps any specialized processor can be
functionally unitary in a given task, but may be decomposed and reorganized for some
other task. (1.45). See dissociation, cooperative processing.
global access. The ability of many specialized processors to place or support messages
on the global workspace. The input side of global distribution.
global distribution of conscious information (global broadcasting). The ability of
conscious signals to be made available very widely to numerous specialized processors.
The output side of global access. (2.5)
global variable. In computer science, a variable that is defined for more than one sub-
system of a larger system.
global workspace. A memory that can be accessed by numerous specialized
processors, whose contents are widely broadcast or distributed, in principle to all
specialists in the nervous system. One of the three major constructs of GW theory. (2.2)
Global Workspace (GW) theory. The theory developed in this book, which associates
conscious experience with a rather simple architecture of the psychological system. GW
theory has three basic constructs: a global workspace, a set of specialized unconscious
processors, and a set of unconscious contexts that serve to select, evoke, and define
conscious contents. (2.2)
goal addressability. Some specialized processors seem to be responsive to goals,
especially conscious goals (1.45, 7.2, 7.3). See biofeedback training, ideomotor theory.
goal image. In the GW version of James' ideomotor theory, a mental image of a future
state which serves to recruit processors and subgoals that work to achieve the future
state. Goal images, if they are conscious long enough to recruit an action, are generally
consistent with the dominant goal hierarchy. The ideomotor theory suggests that
conscious goal images are inherently impulsive; i.e., they tend to result in action unless
they are rapidly contradicted by another conscious event, or by a goal context. (See
default execution). It is conceivable however that very fleeting goal images may
trigger involuntary actions by well-prepared systems before they have been edited or
controlled by the dominant goal hierarchy (7.3). This loss of control may explain slips
of speech and action, and even psychopathological symptoms.
goal structure. See goal hierarchy.
goal context. A context that constrains conscious goal images without itself being
conscious. Also called an intention (4.23, 6.4, 7.3). See Dominant Goal Hierarchy.
goal hierarchy. A multi-leveled goal structure, consisting of goals and subgoals. Each
level may be considered a goal context.. It seems likely that people become conscious of
under-determined choice-points in any dominant goal hierarchy. (6.13, 7.3, 9.2).
habituation. Most generally, decrease of information processing activity upon
repetition of input (1.24, 5.13). All neural structures habituate selectively to repetitive
stimulation. That is, they will decrease their activity to the repeated input, but not to
novel input. Sokolov (1963) has argued that habituation of the Orienting Responses
(closely associated with conscious surprise) cannot be a fatigue effect, since fatigue
would not operate selectively. Instead, he suggests that habituation reflects a learning
process in which the nervous system maintains a model of the stimulus even when it
has become habituated (and hence is unconscious). GW theory considers habituation as
a Redundancy Effect.
habituation of awareness is one kind of selective decrease in responsiveness, in which
functions associated with consciousness habituate, including the Orienting Response,
perceptual awareness, etc. (1.24, 5.13). See Redundancy Effects.
higher-level contexts. The higher levels of a context hierarchy, which are more stable
and are presupposed by lower levels (4.32). Thus higher-level changes in a context
hierarchy propagate more widely, to all lower levels, than do low-level changes (4.43,
9.44).
horse-race, counter-voluntary errors as a losing, (7.32) Unwanted errors occur in the
case of slips of speech and action, psychopathology and voluntarily resisted
automaticity (7.5). It is attractive to suppose in these cases that a goal image tends to be
executed by default unless it is interrupted by other editing systems. If editing takes
too long, the erroneous goal will be executed. Thus one can imagine a race between
editing time and execution time.
hypnosis. True hypnosis, of the kind found in the highly hypnotizable fraction of the
population, is interpreted in GW theory as an absorbed state, in which the dominant
context hierarchy allows very little outside competition for access to consciousness. As
a result, conscious goal images can exercise great ideomotor control over thought and
action (7.7).
ideomotor theory. In William James and others, the notion that conscious goals are
inherently impulsive, and tend to be carried out by default, unless they are inhibited by
other conscious thoughts or intentions. This theory can be straightforwardly
incorporated into GW theory, and helps to explain aspects of voluntary action, the
problem of non-qualitative conscious events, and a number of other puzzles (7.3).
imageless-thought controversy. About the beginning of the 20th century, an intense
controversy about the status of quasi-conscious events that seem to accompany the "set"
of solving a problem, and abstract thoughts in general. This controversy was thought by
many behaviorists to discredit the entire psychology of the 19th century; in fact, it was
quite substantive, and raised central issues about the role of consciousness (1.25, 7.64).
informativeness. In GW theory, one of the necessary conditions for a conscious event
(5.0, 5.4, 11.4). Conscious input is always interpreted in an implicit context of
alternatives, and results in a reduction of uncertainty among these alternatives. If the
uncertainty has been reduced to zero, consciousness of the input is lost because its
information content is now zero. (See Redundancy Effects ). Even the significance of a
conscious event, which clearly affects the chances of its remaining conscious, can be
interpreted as information provided by the event within a dominant goal context.
information. Formally, the case of a sender, a receiver, and message channel, in which a
signal sent to the receiver serves to reduce uncertainty among the receiver's pre-existing
alternatives (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). The mathematical measure of information
based on this definition has been extraordinarily influential in computer science,
communication engineering, and even theoretical physics and biology. In psychology
there has been debate about its usefulness, though it has been successfully applied in a
number of cases. We claim that a somewhat broader conception of information is
central to the understanding of consciousness (5.0). See informativeness, Redundancy
Effects.
inhibition. See activation.
inner speech, inner dialogue. (1.12, 1.34, 1.54, 8.16) Clearly one of the most important
modalities of conscious experience. It has been widely proposed that inner speech is
often abbreviated, and we suggest that, insofar as we share communicative context with
ourselves, only those elements that distinguish between alternatives in this context need
become conscious (4.24).
input into the global workspace . Input into the global workspace allows global access
by many different cooperating and competing processors (2.4, 1.4). There is
considerable evidence for a minimum integration time of about 100 milliseconds
between separate stimuli. The output of the global workspace is globally distributed
(2.5).
intention. See goal context.
internal consistency. See necessary conditions for consciousness.
involuntary actions. Voluntary actions are mainly automatic in their details, except
for certain novel and informative aspects (7.2). Yet even the automatic components of
normal action are perceived as voluntary if they are consistent with the Dominant Goal
Hierarchy. Other automatic actions are unwanted, orcounter-voluntary, such as slips
of the tongue, voluntarily resisted automatisms, and psychopathological symptoms
(7.1, 7.5). It is important therefore to use the term "involuntary" with care, since it can
mean either "automatic and wanted" or "unwanted" (counter-voluntary). See also self-
attributed and self-alien.
learning. GW theory claims that consciousness inherently involves adaptation and
learning. While it is difficult to demonstrate that consciousness is a necessary condition
for learning, the theory suggests that there is an upward monotonic function between
the amount of information to be learned and the duration of conscious involvement
necessary to learn it. See informativeness, zero point problem.
learning without awareness. See zero point problem.
Learning Function of consciousness. See learning. (10.2)
limited adaptibility of specialized processors. By virtue of the fact that they are
specialized, these systems can only deal with a limited range of input (1.45, 2.1).
limited capacity. See central limited capacity.
lingua franca. A trade language, such as Swahili or English in many parts of the world.
By extension, a common language for different neural structures that may do their
preferred processing in separate codes (1.54). Given the perceptual bias of conscious
contents, one likely possibility is a spatio-temporal code. (3.2) Many neural structures
are indeed sensitive to spatio-temporal information.
linguistic hierarchy. The standard view that language is represented structurally in a
series of levels, going from acoustic analysis or motor control, to more abstract levels
like phonemics, morphemics, words, syntax, semantics and pragmatics (2.32). Each of
these levels can be treated as a specialized processor, or a collection of them.
logical positivism. Probably the most influential philosophy of science in the first half
of the 20th century; it discouraged free theoretical construct formation in psychology,
and the study of consciousness in particular (1.11). See behaviorism.
long term memory (LTM). The store of permanent memory, generally said to include
episodic memory, an autobiographical record of conscious experience, and semantic
memory, a store of abstract rules and knowledge. LTM could also plausibly include
permanent skills, the lexicon, and even long-lasting attitudes and personality features.
See short term memory.
meditation. Meditative practices seem universally to involve repetition of short words,
phrases, or sometimes visual input over a long period of time. They therefore seem to
evoke Redundancy Effects, which are known to directly influence conscious
experience (5.72).
mental effort. (7.62, 8.15, 9.22) The subjective experience of resistance to current goals.
Mental effort takes up central limited capacity, suggesting that it involves the global
workspace. Effortful action may involve an implicit comparison between the predicted
and actual time to the goal (see execution time ). The perception of effort may be a key
to the experience of voluntary control (7.62).
mental workload. Dual task measures can be used to assess the degree to which a task
takes up central limited-capacity. To the extent that doing one task degrades another,
this loss of efficiency may be used to measure the workload imposed by the first task
(1.34).
metacognition. Knowing one's own mental processes. One kind of metacognition
involves self-monitoring, the conscious comparison of one's performance with some
set of criteria (9.3). (See self-concept ). Metacognitive self-monitoring may be degraded
in absorbed states like hypnosis , which may dominate conscious limited capacity to
the exclusion of the conscious components of self-monitoring (7.7). The operational
definition of consciousness is unavoidably metacognitive at the present time (1.2).
metacognitive access. The ability to retrieve one's own conscious contents. There are
clear cases of conscious experiences that are difficult to retrieve, such as the Sperling
phenomenon (1.12). But metacognitive access is indispensable to the commonly used
operational definition of consciousness. See metacognition, source attribution, source
amnesia.
minimal contrasts, method of. See contrastive analysis.
minimum integration time of conscious experience. The time during which different
inputs are integrated into a single conscious experience (2.4). Blumenthal (197x)
provides numerous sources of evidence suggesting a minimum integration time of 50-
250 milliseconds, centering about 100 milliseconds.
Mind's Eye. The domain of visual imagery, with many resemblances to visual
perception. (2.62)
Momentary Intentions. Kahneman's (1973) term, equivalent to short-term goal
contexts in GW theory.
necessary conditions for conscious experience and access. GW theory suggests that
consciousness involves mental representations that are globally distributed, internally
consistent, and informative. In addition, consciousness may require some minimum
integration time, and it seems to have a perceptual bias. (11.4)
non-qualitative conscious events. (1.25, 6.52, 7.63, 7.64) Immediately accessible
concepts, beliefs, intentions, and expectations that are reported as "conscious," but
which do not have clear perceptual qualities like color, taste, texture, and clear figure-
ground boundaries in space and time. (See qualitative conscious events ).
non-specific interference. Simultaneous events tend to interfere with each other if they
are conscious and voluntary, even if they involve apparently different systems: visual
imagery will interfere with action control, mental arithmetic with tactile reaction time.
Non-specific interference declines when the competing tasks become automatic with
practice (1.34).
objectification. Conscious contents tend to be object-like; even abstract consciously
accessible concepts tend to be reified and treated as objects (1.53, 4.14, 5.34). But the
same events after habituation are not object-like, and can be said to be contextualized.
When contextual representations are disrupted, and become object-like again, one can
speak of decontex-tualization.
object-like nature of conscious contents. See objectification.
operational definition of consciousness. See consciousness.
options context. A particular kind of goal context that allows two or more potential
conscious contents to be compared, so that one can be selected voluntarily (8.2). An
options context is comparable to a menu or directory on a computer. See voluntary
attention, Decision-Making.
organization vs. flexibility. The nervous system encounters a trade-off between
responding in an organized way to predictable input (which is fast and efficient), and
dealing with novel situations in a flexible way (which is slow and adaptive). The global
workspace architecture works to optimize this trade-off. (2.72, 10.01)
Orienting Response. (OR) The bodily reaction to novel stimuli, first detailed by Pavlov.
The OR includes orienting of receptors, desynchronization in the EEG, pupillary
dilation, autonomic changes in heart rate, skin conductivity, and dilation or
constriction of blood vessels. Recently the P300 component of the evoked cortical
potential has been added to this list.
parallel processing. (1.44, 2.1) In principle, different specialized processors can act
simultaneously with respect to each other (in parallel), except insofar as they must use
the limited-capacity global workspace. See seriality.
perceptual bias of conscious experience (2.41). The fact that qualitative experiences in
perception, imagery, bodily feeling, etc., are perceptual or quasi-perceptual in nature.
Even conscious experiences associated with motor control and abstract thought tend to
be quasi-perceptual (7.22). It is possible that abstract conceptual events, which we speak
of in terms of conscious access rather than conscious experience, may operate through
momentary quasi-perceptual images (7.63). See necessary conditions for conscious
experience, qualitative , non-qualitative, and ideomotor theory.
peripheral consciousness. The quasi-conscious "fringe" of conscious experience
associated with the periphery of the visual field and other sensory domains, and with
the temporal horizon of focal experiences that are just about to fade; more generally,
any borderline conscious experience. Peripheral consciousness is usually contrasted
with focal consciousness (1.12).
potential contexts. (4.35) Contexts that may be available among the specialized
processors, and that may be evoked in a variety of tasks. For example, since all actions
require detailed temporal control, different actions may use a common pre-existing
context for this purpose. This is not just a specialized processor, since potential
contexts, when they are evoked and begin to dominate the global workspace, can act to
influence conscious contents without themselves being conscious. See context, (4.31,
6.4, 7.32), options context.
pre-attentive processing. A term used by Neisser (1967) and others to describe rapid
hypothesis-testing of perceptual input before it becomes conscious (1.24, 2.32).
presupposed knowledge. The context that shapes conceptual thought, but which is not
readily consciously accessible (4.22).
priming. (4.1) Conscious events increase the chances of related events becoming
conscious; they decrease reaction time to related material, and can sway the
interpretation of related ambiguous or noisy stimuli. See Context-setting Function of
consciousness.
Prioritizing Function. Attentional systems, which control access to consciousness, are
very sensitive to significance. A stimulus such as one's own name is apparently made
significant by conscious association with high-level goals. Attentional control can be
used to rehearse this association until it becomes routine, thus guaranteeing automatic
access priority to the stimulus. (8.02, 8.2, 10.5)
problem-solving, spontaneous. Incomplete or unresolved conscious events tend to
trigger unconscious problem-solving, even if these events are not reported to involve
deliberate attempts to solve the problems. (6.2)
process. a set of transformations of a representation. (1.4)
processor. a relatively unitary, organized collection of processes that work together in
the service of a particular function. (1.4)
processor, specialized. (specialist) (1.45) One of the three main constructs of GW theory
. Specialized processors can be viewed as relatively autonomous, unconscious systems
that are limited to one particular function such as vertical line detection in the visual
system, noun phrase identification in syntax, or motor control of some particular
muscle group. Specialists are said to be recursively organized, so that they consist of
other specialists and can make up even larger specialized processors. That implies that
they can be decomposed and reorganized into another specialist if some other function
becomes dominant (1.45, 4.43, 9.44). When a set of specialists provides routine control
of GW contents without becoming conscious, it begins to act as a context (4.31).
psychopathology. A state of mind characterized by severe and disabling loss of
voluntary control over mental images, inner speech, actions, emotions, or percepts.
GW theory suggests an approach to this loss of control through the ideomotor theory.
See involuntary.
psychodynamics. In the general sense used here, the study of goal conflicts, especially
when one of the goals is not consciously or metacognitively accessible (7.81, 9.4). A
complete psychodynamics presupposes an adequate theory of volition and
metacognition. See ideomotor theory.
publicity metaphor. The main metaphor of Global Workspace theory, motivated by
the need of specialized processors to communicate globally with others to solve novel
problems cooperatively (2.2, 2.5).
qualitative conscious experiences. Experiences like mental imagery, perception,
emotional feelings, etc., which have perceptual qualities like color, texture, taste, and
the like. Contrasted with non-qualitative events that are often described as conscious.
See also perceptual bias of conscious events. (1.54, 2.41, 7.63)
qualitative context. The unconscious shaping context of qualitative experiences. An
example in visual perception is the automatic assumption that light comes from
above, a contextual expectation that shapes the experience of visual depth without
ever being conscious (4.1).
range of conscious contents. (2.12) The enormous range of possible conscious contents
contrasts sharply with the apparently limited range of any single specialized
unconscious processor. Presumably a syntax processor cannot handle motor control or
visual input, but consciousness is at times involved in all of these functions.
receiving systems. Specialized processors that receive a certain global message.
Chapter 5 develops the argument that receiving systems must feed back their interest in
the global message, thus joining the coalition of systems supporting global access for
the message (5.3).
recursive organization (of processors and contexts). Specialized processors may be
made up of other processors, and can join a coalition of others to create a superordinate
processor, depending upon the current function that needs to be served. Thus a tightly
organized set of processors is also a processor (1.45). The properties of recursively
defined entities have been worked out in recent mathematics and computer science.
Likewise for contexts. (4.31). See cooperative processing.
Recruiting Function of consciousness. The ability of global messages to gain the
cooperation of many receiving systems in pursuing its ends (7.3, 10.4).
Redundancy Effects. After an event has been learned, repetition causes it to fade from
consciousness (1.23). This phenomenon is found at all levels of conscious involvement:
in all sensory systems, in motor control, and in conceptual representation as well (5.13).
Redundancy Effects provide the strongest argument for the notion that informativeness
is a necessary condition for conscious experience. Apparent exceptions can be handled
in the same framework (5.4). See habituation of awareness.
relational capacity of consciousness. The nervous system's impressive ability to relate
two conscious events to each other in a novel way (2.1, 5.11, 6.2). See context-
sensitivity.
reminders . In order to maintain the unconsciouscontexts that constrain conscious
experience, we may need conscious reminders. This is especially true for contexts that
encounter competition, that are effortful to maintain, or that involve choice-points with
some degree of uncertainty (4.42). The need for reminders may explain the role of social
symbols like membership tokens, rituals, periodic festivals, rites of passage, etc., some
of which seem clearly designed to create an intense conscious experience to strengthen
largely unconscious contexts.
representation. A theoretical object that bears an abstract resemblance (isomorphism)
to something outside of itself, and which is primarily shaped by this resemblance (1.41).
Operationally, a representation is often inferred if an organism can accurately identify
matches and mismatches between current and past experience. Representation is
currently an axiomatic notion in cognitive science; it shares many features with the idea
of an adaptive system.
repression. Motivated exclusion from consciousness, especially when the process of
exclusion is itself unconscious. Some patterns emerging from GW theory resemble
Freudian "repression proper," sometimes called after-expulsion. This is the case when
fleeting conscious goal images trigger actions before they can be properly edited by
processors that would normally compete against them. Metacognitive access to these
events may be minimal, since the goal images are fleeting. They may nevertheless
trigger involuntary actions like slips (7.51, 7.8, 8.5). See psychodynamics.
residual subjectivity. The argument made by some (e.g. Natsoulas, 19xx) that we can
never fully explain the subjective component of conscious experience (1.27).
Reticular Formation (RF) of the brain stem and mid-brain. A densely interconnected
core of the brain-stem. that extends to part of the thalamus. Ablation of the Reticular
Formation generally leads to coma, and stimulation leads to waking and improved
perceptual discrimination. In Chapter 3 parts of the RF are described as belonging to
the Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating System (ERTAS), a convenient label for the
set of neural structures involved in waking consciousness, sleep, and coma (3.1).
selective attention. An experimental technique in which two separate, densely
coherent streams of information are provided, typically to each ear, in such a way that
the subject can only be conscious of one stream at a time. GW theory treats selective
attention as a contextual fixedness effect (4.12). See filter theory, Filter Paradox,
acontextual.
self-alien experiences. (Also called ego-dystonic ). A large set of normal and
pathological experiences in which people report some form of loss of self (9.1). These
may vary from severe depersonalization, to making a disavowed statement or an
involuntary slip of the tongue. Self-alien experiences can be contrasted to closely
comparable self-attributed experiences, leading to a contrastive analysis that places
empirical constraints on the notion of self.
self-attributed experiences. (Also called ego-syntonic ). Most experiences are
attributed to a "self" as observer, and control of voluntary action is attributed to a "self"
as agent (9.1). However, there are important cases where experience and control is
perceived to be self-alien. A contrastive analysis comparing similar self-alien and self-
attributed experiences strongly suggests that the concept of self is scientifically
necessary, and provides empirical constraints on this notion.
self-system (self). A contrastive analysis between self-attributed and self-alien
experiences suggests that self can be treated as the overarching context of experience
(9.2). In Jamesian terms, this involves the "self as I," rather than the "self as me" --- the
latter involves a conception of self as an object of experience. See self-concept.
self-concept. An abstract representation of oneself, presumably accumulated over many
experiences of self-monitoring. The self-concept may involve objectification or an
external perspective on oneself, and is presumably used primarily to control and
evaluate performance (9.3). Compared to the great complexity and subtlety of the self-
system, the self-concept as it is most often expressed by people seems simplistic and
tendentious.
self-consciousness. Seeself-monitoring.
Self-maintenance Function of consciousness. (9.44, 10.9). Conscious experiences serve to
update the self-system, and at times may severely violate its deeper contextual levels.
Attentional control of consciousness then becomes a major tool for maintaining
stability of the self-system.
Self-monitoring Function of consciousness. (10.8) One major role of consciousness is to
track aspects of one's own performance, to see if they match one's self-concept.
self-monitoring, conscious. Tracking one's own performance by comparison to some
set of criteria (8.01, 9.02, 9.31). See self-concept, self-system, objectification.
seriality. Events that are conscious or under voluntary control are constrained to occur
one after the other, in the limited-capacity bottle-neck of the nervous system. (2.15). The
same events after habituation or automaticity may occur in parallel.
Short Term Memory. (STM) Immediate, rehearsable memory, which seems limited in
size to 7 plus or minus two separate elements, if rehearsal is permitted (1.34). The
elements or "chunks" of STM are typically letters, numbers, words, or judgment
categories, which are themselves quite complex. This suggests that the chunks of STM
involve knowledge from long-term memory (LTM), so that STM and LTM cannot be
segregated.
significance. Not all stimuli are equal: some are far more important than others,
biologically, socially, or personally. GW theory treats significant stimuli as information
that serves to reduce uncertainty in a goal context (5.23, 9.22).
"snowballing" access to consciousness. (3.21). There are both empirical and theoretical
reasons to think that access of some input to consciousness is not immediate, but may
involve a circular flow of feedback between potential conscious contents and numerous
receiving processors, which are needed to support global access for the potential
content (5.3).
source amnesia. In metacognition, the failure to attribute conscious experiences to the
correct event in past experience. Post-hypnotic amnesia for a hypnotic suggestion is a
good example. Source amnesia occurs in normal states of mind when people forget
their reasons for having made even a major decision, in part because decisions often
change the context of experience, so that the pre-decision context is lost. This makes
recall difficult. Source amnesia is indeed the norm, not the exception in human
development. A major source of error in self-monitoring. See source attribution. (7.64,
8.52, 9.52)
source attribution In metacognition, the problem of assigning events to their proper
sources (7.64, 8.52), especially in attributing the sources of one's own actions to previous
conscious goals or conditions. One's own goals may be difficult to make conscious, if
the goal images that control novel aspects of one's actions are quite fleeting; they may
then be difficult to retrieve, leading to systematic misinterpretation of one's own goals
and motives. There is much evidence for such failures of source attribution, even when
the lost information is not particularly painful or embarassing. See source amnesia,
metacognitive access, self-monitoring.
specialists. See processors, specialized.
specialized unconscious processors. See processors, specialized.
stimulation vs. information. (5.1, 5.2) There is much evidence that the nervous system is
not sensitive to physical stimulation as such, but is instead highly sensitive to
information. For example, the absence of an expected stimulus can be highly
informative. See Redundancy Effects.
stopped retinal images. (5.13) The eye is usually protected from excessively repetitive
input by eye movements, especially the rapid tremor called physiological nystagmus.
Nystagmus can be defeated by moving a visual stimulus in synchrony with the eye;
under these circumstances, visual input fades quickly and tends to be transformed. See
Redundancy Effects.
stream of consciousness. The apparently unsystematic "flights" and "perches" of
conscious ideation, in the words of William James. Explained in GW theory as an
ongoing interplay between conscious contents and unconscious contextual systems,
especially goal contexts in the process of solving spontaneously posed problems. (6.4)
See problem solving.
subgoals. To solve a problem or execute an action, conscious goal images can recruit
specialized processors such as muscular effectors. However, in most cases the goal
cannot be achieved directly and subgoals must be recruited. These can be viewed as
goal contexts that can become part of the dominant goal hierarchy. (6.4, 7.22) Novel
components of these subgoal contexts may be broadcast to recruit new resources to
work toward achieving the subgoal (7.22).
subliminal perception. See zero point problem.
suggestibility. (7.72, 8.24, 9.31). Highly hypnotizable subjects apparently treat the
hypnotist's suggestions the way others treat their own inner speech: with a great deal
of trust and credibility. The ideomotor theory suggests that hypnosis is an absorbed
state in which there is minimal competition against goal images. In addition,
metacognitive self-monitoring seems to be limited, perhaps because it requires central
limited capacity that is not available during absorption. Under these circumstances,
unusual conscious contents are presumably not edited. Credulity and trust may
simply result from an absence of this Editing Function.
surprise. The fact that surprise seems to erase conscious contents has been pointed out
by several writers. In GW theory, surprise can be treated as a momentary erasure of
the global workspace by competing contents and contexts. The dominant context
hierarchy is disrupted as a result, and works to limit damage to its lowest levels (4.43).
Surprising disruption of high-level goal contexts can be stressful and lead to pathology
(9.44).
thalamus. (3.12) Traditionally viewed as a "way station" to the cortex, parts of the
thalamus resemble a global workspace with mutually competitive input from a great
number of sources, and widely broadcast output through the Diffuse Thalamic
Projection System. The outer shell of the thalamus (the nucleus reticularis thalami)
seems especially well-suited to this task. See Extended Reticular-Thalamic Activating
System.
Theatre Hypothesis of conscious experience. The view, found in both modern and
traditional thought, that conscious experience is much like the stage of a theatre in
which the audience cannot see the management of the actors on stage. A modern
equivalent is the "searchlight" metaphor; an ancient version is the common sense of
Aristotle and Eastern thought (1.31)
Threshold Paradox. When does something become conscious? If any global message is
conscious, then global broadcasting cannot be used to recruit the coalition of processors
that is needed to gain global access for it in the first place. But if a global message is not
necessarily conscious, what then are the necessary conditions for consciousness? There
are two theoretical alternatives, labeled theWaiting Room option and the Momentary
Access option (2.43). The former suggests a hierarchy of increasingly global
workspaces, which a potential conscious content must follow to become truly global
and conscious, accumulating supporting coalitions along the way. The latter suggests
that all systems may have brief global access in order to recruit supportive coalitions,
but that such brief global messages are not experienced or recalled as conscious (see
fleeting conscious events, snowballing activation ).
Tip-of-the-Iceberg Hypothesis of conscious experience. The view that consciousness is
only the visible tip of a very large and invisible iceberg of unconscious processes. (1.31)
Tip of the Tongue (TOT) phenomenon. The process of searching for a known but
elusive word, which clearly involves a set of criteria for the missing word, though these
criteria are not qualitatively conscious. The criteria are said to constitute an intention
or goal context. Further, people often report a fleeting but unretrievable mental image
of the missing word, indicating that there may indeed be fleeting conscious goal
images. (6.1, 7.64, 8.52).
top-down contextual influences. (4.1) The conscious experience of sensory input is
always shaped by unconscious contexts.
triadic pattern. Many types of spontaneous problem-solving show a conscious stage of
problem assignment, followed by unconscious incubation of routine problem
components, and culminating in conscious display of the solution. (6.2, 6.4)
unconscious, operational definition. When people are asked under optimal conditions
to retrieve some information that is clearly represented in the nervous system, and they
cannot do so, we are willing to infer the existence of unconscious events (1.21, 1.41).
Examples are the regularities of syntax and the properties of highly automatic tasks.
GW theory suggests that we are unconscious of anything that does not meet all the
necessary conditions for conscious experience. This implies that there are several ways
for something to be unconscious (11.4).
unconscious choice-points in the flow of processing. Complex processes involve many
choice-points between alternative representations. For example, in speech perception
the linguistic system must often chose between two alternative interpretations of a
word. Which choice is made can often be influenced by previous conscious experiences
(4.13, 7.72). See priming.
underdetermined choice-points in the control of action (7.72). Choice-points in the
control of action may be quite uncertain; consciousness may be necessary to help
resolve the uncertainty. Underdetermined choice-points are likely to become conscious
because they involve points of high uncertainty. See ambiguity.
universal editing. (7.32). A conscious goal image is thought to be broadcast globally to
all specialized processors in the system. This implies that all processors can also
compete against conscious goal images and thus interrupt execution of a planned
action. See editing.
updating. Many unconscious specialized processors may simultaneously track
conscious experiences, in order to update their special domain in the light of current
circumstances (5.14)
variable composition of specialized processors. See recursive organization.
vigilance. The task of monitoring conscious signals, often quite repetitive ones. A
difficult task that declines in accuracy in a matter of minutes. See Redundancy Effects.
violations of context. Context can be treated as a set of expectations about conscious
experiences, and of course expectations can be violated. Often violation of contextual
expectations causes them to become consciously accessible (4.14). In the context
hierarchy, deeper violations propagate more widely, and demand more extensive
adaptation to rebuild a functioning context hierarchy (4.43, 9.44). See surprise, failure-
driven access to contexts.
voluntary action. (7.00) Action that is consistent with one's Dominant Goal Hierarchy,
and hence is generally self-attributed. Because the conscious components of the goal
hierarchy are globally broadcast, many systems have access to them; hence these
conscious components are tacitly edited by multiple criteria. Developmentally one can
argue that at some point in one's history, all informative and significant components of
a voluntary action must have been edited. See ideomotor theory.
voluntary attention. Attention is defined here as the control of access to consciousness.
Since GW Theory claims that voluntary control involves conscious (though often
fleeting) goal images, it follows that voluntary attention is conscious control of access
to consciousness (8.12). This can be accomplished through the use of an options context,
comparable to a menu or directory on a computer, which allows different conscious
options to become readily available, so that one can choose voluntarily between them.
wakefulness. In GW theory, a state in which the global workspace is operating. Parts of
the ERTAS system are known to be involved in the maintenance of wakefulness and
sleep. (3.1) See cortical arousal.
working memory. See Short Term Memory.
zero-point problem. It is remarkably difficult to find indisputable evidence about
events near the threshold of conscious experience, such as subliminal perception,
learning without awareness, and the problem of blind sight. Because zero-point
evidence is so controversial, the present approach is based initially on contrastive
analysis of clear cases that are not disputed. Much can be accomplished in this way.
Only after establishing a reasonable framework based on agreed-upon evidence do we
suggest hypotheses about the zero point. (Preface, 1.12, 7.64) See fleeting conscious
events.
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