A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness
Index of Figures
| Figure 1.12 | The continuum of clear and fuzzy events |
| Figure 1.21 | The Sperling Experiment: momentary conscious events may be difficult to recall |
| Figure 1.24 | The Pani Experiment: Predictable mental images habituate with practice |
| Figure 1.37 | Similarities between GW terms and other widespread ideas |
| Figure 1.41 | The Sokolov argument: Habituated stimuli are still represented in the nervous system |
| Figure 1.44 | The standard linguistic hierarchy |
| Figure 2.13 | Trade-offs to maintain consistency in the Ames distorted room |
| Figure 2.14 | Conscious experiences are always internally consistent |
| Figure 2.2 | Model 1: A global workspace in a distributed system |
| Figure 2.42 | Some time parameters of conscious experience and recall |
| Figure 2.62 | The "Mind's Senses" as a global workspace equivalent |
| Figure 3.12 | The ERTAS: a neural global workspace? |
| Figure 3.13 | One possible scenario: Cortical centers competing for access to ERTAS |
| Figure 3.21 | Model 1A: some changes suggested by the neurophysiology |
| Figure 4.11 | Priming effects: Conscious events increase access to similar events |
| Figure 4.14 | Presuppositions of the concept of "buying" that may become conscious upon violation |
| Figure 4.23 | A significance hierarchy of goal contexts |
| Figure 4.3 | Modeling contextual knowledge |
| Figure 4.35 | Model 2. Contexts compete and cooperate to influence conscious experience |
| Figure 4.41 | Surprising events erase conscious contents; the disruption may propagate through the context hierarchy |
| Figure 5.11 | The Dalmatian in the Park: the need to establish a context for conscious experience |
| Figure 5.14 | Conscious events help to create new contexts and to evoke old ones |
| Figure 5.2 | Adaptation versus the search for information |
| Figure 5.3 | Consciousness involves reduction of uncertainty in contexts and processors |
| Figure 5.31 | Model 3: Feedback from adapting processors |
| Figure 5.53 | An upward monotonic function between learning and information |
| Figure 6.13 | The intention to speak: Many unconscious goal contexts cooperate to constrain a single sentence |
| Figure 6.21 | Model 4. The triadic pattern pattern of spontaneous problem-solving |
| Figure 6.4 | Goal contexts and the stream of consciousness |
| Figure 7.3 | Model 5. A modern ideomotor theory of voluntary control |
| Figure 7.51 | A slip of the tongue as a failure of competing systems to edit the error in time |
| Figure 7.61 | Implicit decision-making as a vote between competing sets of processors |
| Figure 8.21 | Model 6A: Automatic attention is controlled by goals |
| Figure 8.22 | Metacognitive access: Recalling a conscious event from Short Term Memory |
| Figure 8.23 | Model 6B: Voluntary control of attention; Options contexts serve as directories of readily available conscious topics |
| Figure 8.42 | Repression as source amnesia for avoided conscious contents |
| Figure 9.2 | Self as the enduring context of experience and action |
| Figure 9.22 | The self-concept can evoke conscious self-monitoring |
| Figure 9.23 | Model 7: Self-concept as a supervisory context within the self-system |
| Figure 9.34 | Disruption due to competing contexts can propagate downward from the self system to local intentions |